Competing rms are aected by nancial reporting mainly through revealing relevant information. As suggested by recent literature (Bagnoli, et al. 2010) , the biased disclosure has impact on the rms' competitive position in a product market setting. So when such information is distorted by regulated bias such as conservative reporting policy, it comes into question whether it aects the outcome of product market competition. The paper investigates the eect of such distortion on the output and prots of rms that competing in a product market. And besides incumbent rms competing in a Cournot fashion, the setting also allows an entry game where the disclosed information might induce a potential entrant. Through this setting the interaction between product market competition and conservative bias is studied. The results show that when potential entry is not considered and competing rms precommit to such accounting reporting system, rms would benet from reporting conservatively by obtaining higher output, and there is an optimal level of conservatism to maximize the expected prot in the duopoly setting however it depends on the information quality of the signal. When in the presence of a potential entrant, a more conservative reporting system would not necessarily benet the incumbent rms although the potential entrant would benet from a less conservative reporting system. JEL classications: L1, M41
Introduction
The economic determinants and consequences of accounting conservatism have been studied extensively in a range of dierent economic scenarios such as investment decision, debt contracting etc. However, its role in a product market setting when facing competing rms is less explored. As suggested by some voluntary disclosure literature with respect to competition (Darrough,1993 ; Harris,1998 etc.), a competing rm may disclose certain information in order to gain competitive advantage. But if the required disclosure is somehow biased by the conservative nature of imposed accounting rules, then it comes into question how the competing rms perceive the accounting bias in the disclosed information. Does the conservative reporting only perceived to be merely a distortion of information in the competition case or it has real impact on economic agents?
With regards to the investment scenario, Feltham and Ohlson (1996) and Zhang (2002) state that conservative bias has no eect on the inference investors make about the rm's value. It is not trivial that the same claim holds for the competition scenario. So this paper investigates how imposed conservative reporting could inuence the structure and outcome of an oligopolistic market and whether the eect remain the same when dierent competition is considered, for instance, entry competition.
There are some evidences showing that in a competitive market environment, certain required conservative approach may provide company with some advantage or at least companies don't raise dierent opinion about this policy.
For instance, in highly competitive industry such as high-tech industry, competition among rms for market share and creation of entry barriers create large portion of R&D expenditures (Lev and Sougiannis, 1996) , however, when the standard was set for more conservative practice i.e., forbidding the capitalization of R&D expenses, rms posed little opposition to such regulation, especially the case of SFAS2 for American rms. So it is interesting to see whether the regulated accounting bias has real eects on rms' output decisions and prots in a product market setting. With respect to the inclusion of potential entry in the setting, Zimmerman (2011) 1 pointed out that nancial reporting system characteristics such as transparency or conservatism likely aects entry by potential competitors. Then it is possible that the conservative bias introduced by the reporting system could aect the potential entrant's entry decision and consequently aect the market structure. 1 
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In several empirical studies such as Dhaliwal et al. (2008) and Folsom (2010) , product market competition is suspected as a possible cause of accounting conservatism. Dhaliwal et al. (2008) document a positive association of this relation. However, Dhole (2010) suggests that this relation might not be monotonous. Hence this paper investigates this relationship further through a competition-disclosure setting. The study contributes to the discussion with some direct theoretical evidence with a model where rms might report conservatively and compete in an product market setting. And the empirical studies for instance Qiang (2003) suggest that the rms with larger market shares might prefer conservative accounting policy because the potential unfavorable regulations such as antitrust actions. As the setting here is the oligopoly model which can be seen as an example of a market with few participants, some implications about how the conservative accounting policy would aect product market outcome and structure could be derived with respect to the antitrust consideration.
First the case where only two rms are competing in duopoly situation is analyzed for the eect of accounting bias on production output and prot. Then the entry decision and triopoly game are considered. The main objective is to observe how the conservatism characteristic aects the disclosed information and the output choice decisions. Since the conservatism feature is imposed by regulation bodies, it is also possible to investigate what the optimal level of conservative bias that maximizes the rms' expected prot in this type of situation 2 .
In the existing competition setting the rms prefer itself to report more conservatively and its competitor less conservative in order to obtain higher output outcomes. And when such an accounting system is imposed, they would be beneted by disclosing lower cost signal regardless what true cost realization is, since this can yield higher production output. With regards to the maximization of expected prot under the existing competition, there exists an optimal level of conservative bias, however it depends on the informativeness of the accounting report. And the accounting bias introduced by the accounting system in fact lowers the incumbent rms' expected prot compared to the benchmark case where an unbiased system is in place. With the presence of potential entry, a less conservative accounting system is preferred by the potential entrant because it increases the entrant's expected prot, however, there is no optimal level of conservative bias can be derived. 2 Although conservatism characteristic is abandoned by IASB, this decision is certainly debatable because the conservative policies are still embedded in the regulations.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 review the relevant literature. Section 3 provides the set ups of the model. Section 4 presents the results and analysis. Section 5 concludes.
2
Literature review
As mention before, the revealed information that aects competing rms is characterized with the feature of conservative reporting. So this paper is related to prior literature that study the disclosure strategies under imperfect product market competition. These studies either focus on rivalry competition between existing rms or the threat of a competitive entrant into the market. For instance, Darrough (1993) concludes that in a duopoly setting the incentives to voluntary disclosure is related with the type of private information and rms can communicate relevant bad news information to rivals to improve coordination.
With respect to entry competition, Gal-Or (1985 ) stated that incumbent rms with unfavorable information tend to disclose such information by considering the incentives from the product market alone. Darrough and Stoughton (1990) show that the single incumbent rm voluntarily disclose bad news to discourage potential entry. Under a conservative reporting system, it might be more likely for rms to put more weight on unfavorable signals when disclosing information. And under such a reporting system, favorable signals are more reliable as they are produced under stricter scrutiny. When a setting with both rivalry rms and potential entry considered, the accounting bias caused by the conservative reporting might benet the existing competitor and also may act as deterrence mechanism for the incumbent rms. So this study contributes to the literature on the interaction between disclosures and competition by specifying the shared information with mandated accounting bias while considering both existing competition and potential entry threat.
There have been some studies intended to dierentiate the disclosed information through nancial reporting manipulation in an imperfect competition setting, for example, accounting fraud (Sadka, 2006) or biased reports (Bagnoli, et al. 2010 ). Bagnoli and Watts (2010) demonstrate rms can inuence their competitive position in the product market by introducing bias into the cost disclosure. What dierentiates this study is that the shared information is assumed to be subjective to a precommitted accounting system where the aggressive or conservative accounting is characterized. So the bias reporting in this study is set out by the regulation instead of management. And such manipulation could also have eects on the rms' competitive position since conservative reporting policies are commonly embedded with accounting regulations.
In addition, Sadka (2004) points out that from regulator's perspective more considerations were applied to the contracting aspects of disclosure in determining the attributes like the conservatism properties, but the eects of information sharing among competitors are less considered. This paper sheds some lights on this issue whether the information sharing situation matters in such scenario. The market demand function for the homogeneous product sold by the rms is P = a − i q i ,where i = 1, 2 or e (the entrant), P is the unit price for the product, a is the intercept of market demand (a > 0) , q 1 , q 2 and q e is the 3 The Cournot set up follows the general setting established in the previous literature like Shapiro (1986) , Cal-Or (1986) and Vives (2002) . Vives (2006) indicates that the disclosure results might be sensitive to the competition type. However Brander and Lewis (1986) suggests that rms are supposed to compete in quantities. And some comparison studies (Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983 etc.) show that after precommit to quantity, rms under Bertrand game yield the same results as Cournot outcomes at least when full information disclosure. So the Cournot competition is used in the current setting. In this setting, further assume that the incumbent rms can't communicate their true cost except through the accounting report. The incumbent rms disclose cost information through nancial reports prior to the output choices. There have been some studies regarding accounting disclosure apply this premise, for example Bagnoli et al. (2010) 4 .The assumption is that a rm's nancial statements can be used to infer the rm's reported marginal costs.. And information regarding raw material, production technology and labor etc. has been considered to reveal companies' cost of production. Pae (2000) points out that management discussion & analysis disclosure reveal factor prices (costs).
Here the reported information can be masked by certain conservative policy.
One also can consider an example that whether rms adopt low or high eciency production technology, and the costs after the adoption are known. The disclosure regarding the adoption information can be dierent when more conservative reporting applies. In general the signal can be considered more like an aggregated measurement that indicates the prot prospects of each rm, since cost information is the main indicator that aect the respective prot in this production-decision process and the rm's only strategic decision is on production quantity.
The entry game is set out similar to Hwang et al. (2000) where their study foucuses on the welfare consequences of incumbent rms' disclosure eect facing entry. What mainly dierentiates this setup is the use of dierent accounting system representation which will be introduced in the next section. Here the entry part of the game is sequential 5 which allows the entrant to observe the disclosed signal before decide to entry the market. The assumptions about the potential entrant are dened as: the potential entrant doesn't disclose its cost information and it learns about its cost at the same time as the existing rms.
Then for the potential competitor it will enter only if its ex-post expected prot is over a xed cost K .
Accounting system
Here this section gives the set-up for the accounting system that denes the Both λ and δ are determined exogenously by the regulators and the incumbent rms disclose the signals generated by this accounting system. The idea here is to capture the information quality of the disclosure and the imposed accounting bias at the same time.
Since the generated signal is either s i L or s i H where i ∈ {1, 2}, costs are either c − ε or c + ε , denote L as true cost is low and H as true cost is high, then the following conditional probabilities of signals for dierent cost type can be dened as:
Based on the signal generated, the rm updates its expectation about the other's cost type. Then accounting features can be observed by the respective posterior probabilities of true states which 5 There are dierent types of market entry games, for instance, simultaneous entry (Dixit and Shapiro, 1986), or sequential entry (Vives, 1988) . 
If λ is increasing, the accounting signals are more informative because the probability revealing true state (P (L|s λ denes the information quality of the accounting report and this could be the case that how informative the rm require to report or how accurate the accounting numbers are. As it is imposed by the accounting system, the information quality of the signal is the mandated informativeness. The degree of conservative or aggressive bias δ is also dened by this accounting system. The general degree of conservatism is usually enforced by standards and accounting 6 These posterior probabilities of true cost type are derived from the respective conditional probabilities. 7 Then these denitions are consistent with the interpretation of conservatism by empirical studies such as Basu (1997) . In his study, the nding on more timely reporting of bad news could be caused by a conservative accounting system with the property that favorable reports have greater information content than unfavorable reports. standards dene certain conservative approach for instance historical cost accounting for positive NPV project or do not allow the capitalization of R&D costs. When a very conservative approach such as expensing all R&D costs is imposed, δ can be considered with a lower value. And when historical cost accounting is applied, the policy is more conservative and accounting numbers are more exact. The accounting signals is generated from the two incumbent rms are under the assumption that these rms are committed to the accounting system 8 . So the rm's management discretion through the reporting process is not considered. In this setting, as the rms precommit to the reporting policy, one example can be raised that when the rms try to determine their depreciation policy of production related equipment, they precommit to a conservative or aggressive approach set out by the standard prior to the actual production.
Then the basic game-play can be illustrated as: The results and analysis
The competition with unbiased accounting system
In this case, suppose two incumbent rms report their true costs and the signals are perfectly correct. So it is the same as their true costs are common knowledge.
Then when there is no entry considered, the equilibrium solutions to the duopoly case are the regular Cournot results with the expected costs. When both rms have low or high costs, their optimal production choices q i are
When one rm has low cost and the other has high cost 9 , the optimal production choices q i are a−c+3ε 3 and a−c−3ε 3
. If the potential entrant decide to enter, then the three rms compete in a triopoly situation. Denote c e as the entrant's cost and known to the players, then the incumbent rms 1 and 2 will choose their optimal output as a+ce−3(c−ε) 4 when both have low cost realization and 8 This truth telling assumption is argued that a strong audit protection is enforced and it makes sure that the rms disclose according to the accounting system. 9 The results are symmetric when the cost realizations are reverse scenario. 
Both rms have low cost
This rm low cost, the competitor high cost
This rm high cost,the competitor low cost 
4.2
Competition in duopoly situation
Production strategies in duopoly situation
First examine the case when only the two existing rms compete, so the entry doesn't occur or equivalent to the case when no entry game is considered. After the rms observe each other's signal regarding cost and there is no entry from the potential entrant, the information sets for two incumbents can be dened as 10 If assume that entrant rm randomize his entry decision, then his expected payo in the this case is the weighted average prot times probability of 1 2 . problem of each incumbent rm can be described : max
In order to nd the linear equilibrium, some output strategies can be conjectured. So similar to the linear strategy approach proposed by Radner (1963) and adopted by Hwang et al. (2000) , when the rms observe these signals, they can use this set of information structure to update their expectation of the rivals' cost. Firm i anticipates that its rival will use signal s i to infer its cost c i and the rival's output choice will condition on the updated expectation.
Competing rms use the disclosed information to infer the rivals' true cost. And since they anticipate the rival rms will do so, they will also include the updated cost information in their output strategy in order to avoid disadvantage in the competition. Then the optimal output strategies are 11 :
In the optimal linear equilibrium, the rm's production strategy depends on its own disclosure despite the fact that rm knows its own cost. As suggested by Bagnoli et al. (2010) , rmi know the rival is using i's disclosure to make inference about i's production cost, and then rm i's production strategy depends on its inference about the rival's decision which depends on the information the rival can extract from the disclosure. Since the respective posterior probabilities are known from the earlier denitions on the disclosed signals, the rms will use these posterior probabilities to update their believe regarding rivals' cost. Dene Ec L and Ec H as the expected values of relevant costs based on the observed signals, as the true cost realization is binary, then they are calculated as follows:
11 Denote superscript d as the duopoly and t as triopoly. See Appendix
As Lemma 1. If the production strategy in the duopoly setting is considered, when λ is held constant, the rm would prefer itself to report more conservatively and its competitor less conservative.
According to the relationship of the accounting bias parameter δ and the expected costs based on the observed signals E (c 1 | s 1 ) and E (c 2 | s 2 ), both E (c 1 | s 1 ) and E (c 2 | s 2 ) are decreasing in the degree of conservative bias, as δ increases the accounting system is less conservative. Here the signal types don't matter anymore, because both Ec L and Ec H are increasing with δ. So the production strategies are increasing when E (c 1 | s 1 ) is getting smaller (the rm itself is more conservative) and E (c 2 | s 2 ) is getting larger (its rival is less conservative). Intuitively, when one rm reporting more conservative, the competitor will update his believe that the rival has lower cost which means competitive advantage in this case. One could argue that the management discretion on accounting policy is not included in the previous assumptions.
However, as proved in Ziv (1993) where two competing rms can send any cost message and is not conned to the truth, the yielded output is the same as the (5) and (6) propose. Then here as we discuss the rms' behavior in a relative manner, it is safe to conclude such results and extend to later analysis.
There are four dierent signal scenarios and two dierent cost realizations, so in total there are eight possible output choices. If expand all the possible output choices from (9) and (10) 
Lemma 2. When imposed accounting system is in place, competing rms would benet from disclosing low cost signal to obtain higher output. , and the cost parameter becomes the expected cost dened by nature. So the accounting bias introduced by the imposed accouting system has no eect on the 12 The probability table in the appendix is used for the weighting. 
Expected prot under duopoly
Next derive the representation of rm i 's expected prot. So from equation (5),
As the derived optimal output strategy q i (y i ) are the solution to the maximization problem for quantity, from the rst order condition we have q i (y i ) = E a − n j=1 q i − c i .
Then the expected prot for rm i in both duopoly and trioploy situation is Proof. See the appendix. Proposition 1 shows that when the accounting system imposes certain degree of conservative bias and the rms precommit to such reporting policy, there could be an optimal level of conservative reporting that maximize the rms' expected prot when facing existing competition, however it is conditional on the informativeness of the reports. This optimal level of conservative bias is at the medium level of conservatism that this system can impose. Such optimal level of conservatism could be considered as what the exsiting rms would lobby for since it maximize their expected prots. And this could provide the implication that in the empirical setting, it is necessary to control for the disclosure quality of the accounting reports. Considering the regulation implications, when regulator is interested in improving the transparency of an oligopoly market by requiring more information disclosure which are quite common for the anti-trust scenarios, the certain level of conservative bias might help to achieve this kind of policy promotion since in fact the existing rms are maximizing their prot.
And if the regulator is interested in limiting the protability of certain oligopoly industry when the quality of disclosure is low, the certain level of conservative reporting policy also helps to minimize the existing competitors' protability.
Since the assumed accounting system can bias the report from two directions conservatively or aggressively, so the expected prot of the two rms under the extreme cases (when δ = 0 and δ = 1 − λ) can be compared with expected prot under the case where an unbiased accounting system is presented. So there are no dierences for the existing competitors between a very conservative system and very aggressive system. They would obtain the same ex-13 This is possible because the value of
18
2 (2δ
appears relatively small because the dened range of parameters. 
So the higher level of λ, the higher the prots under the extreme conservative or aggressive system. Then how informative the accounting reports matters when the imposed accounting system is either very conservative or very aggressive.
4.3
Competition with entry
Production strategies in triopoly situation
When the potential entrant decides to enter the market, since the entrant learns its own cost, its information set would be (c e , s 1 , s 2 ) . The incumbent rms know that entrant enter the market and assume that they will revise their expectation on the entrant's cost, the expected cost is denoted as E (c e | s 1 , s 2 ). Then the optimal output strategies are 14 :
And according to the representation of q t e (y e ), the potential entrant would prefer both incumbents less conservative because the values of E (c 1 | s 1 ) and E (c 2 | s 2 ) are increasing when the conservatism parameter δ is increasing (less conservative) when the informativeness level λis held constant.
The eect of conservative reporting on entry decision
In this section, the entry decision depends on that the potential entrant will entry only if its ex-post net prot is bigger than zero. So the prot Π t e is bigger than the xed entry cost K, or the same as [q t e (y e )] 2 K. Consider the situation when the prot is zero as the boundary condition and the boundary unit cost for the entrantc e can be derived as 15 :
From (9) it is noted that when the conservatism parameter δ is increasing, the boundary costc e is also increasing because of the expected costs of two incumbents increase. So if the incumbents are less conservative, the potential entrant would infer that the incumbent rms have higher production cost, then it will be more likely to enter the market since the entrant faces a higher boundary cost and as long as its own cost is lower than this boundary cost, it will enter the market for sure. Similarly the probability of entry P e also can be derived as 18 :
So this indicates how the incumbents evaluate the entrant's entry probability. When the incumbent rms are reporting more conservatively, the expected values of their costs are lower, then the entry probability of the entrant is decreasing as the entrant infers that the incumbent rms have lower true cost realization.Then considering the probability alone, the incumbent would 15 See the Appendix. 16 Denote superscript LH;HL;LL;HH as the dierent combination of disclosed signals. 17 Comparison in the Appendix. 18 See the Appendix.
prefer to report conservatively. Similar to the break-downs of the boundary costs, the relation of the probabilities of entry under dierent cost signals is:
. When λ = 0 , the probabilities are the same as the signals are not informative.
Lemma 5. When λ is constant, the potential entrant prefer less conservative reporting for both incumbent rms.
Because the entrant's expected prot is [q t e (y e )] 2 · P e − K and both q t e (y e ) and P e are increasing with respect to accounting bias parameter δ. So when the disclosure remains the same level of informativeness, a less conservative reporting system would encourage the potential entrant. This result suggests that when potential competition is considered, a less conservative policy could be better to encourage more market entrants and policy makers might view this as advantage because their aim is often to protect and promote competition in markets.
After obtain the expected cost of the entrant E(c e ) (in the Appendix), all the possible output outcomes for the incumbents in the triopoly game can be expanded from the optimal triopoly production strategies .The following table shows the results: Table 3 : Possible production strategies for the incumbent rms under the triopoly game
Signal type
True cost realization (c − ε ) True cost realization (c + ε)
a − 2 (c + ε) + E (ce) HH Lemma 6. When imposed accounting system is in place, rms would benet from disclosing high cost signal to obtain higher output when entry happens . 
The total expected prot for incumbent rm
As mentioned earlier, the total expected prot for one of the incumbent rm is the weighted average expected prot between both duopoly and triopoly situation. So denote E(Π
T otal i
) as this total expected prot:
) which is weighted on the eight dierent scenarios. After taking rst order condition, it is no feasible solution for an optimal level δ of to maximize the total expected prot for the incumbent rm. However by applying simulation with numeric example, the relation of total expected prot for incumbent rm and the parameters can be illustrated in the following graph ( 
Conclusion
In this paper, a competition model with the disclosed information that contains regulated bias is used to illustrate that how the competitive positions of com- 19 These cases are randomly chosen and more cases of λ can be taken when graphing this simulation but it doesn't change the shape or the relation demonstrated by current gure. 20 The paper is cautious about the generality of this part of results, although the inclusion of more cases in the simulation and change of dierent combination of numeric inputs don't change the observed results. peting rms are aected by the accounting bias imposed by certain accounting system. The results show that if only the existing competition is considered, the incumbent rm would obtain higher output outcome if the rival rm is imposed with a less conservative reporting system. And with respect to the expected prot under duopoly case for each incumbent rm, there exists an optimal level of conservative bias that may maximize the expected prot, but it is subject to the informativeness of the accounting report. This provides testable empirical implication that in the empirical setting, it is critical to control for the information quality of the disclosed report. And the accounting distortion introduced in such accouting system decreases the existing competitors' expected prots.
When the potential entry is considered, the potential entrant prefer a less conservative accounting system since the conservative reporting from the incumbent increase the entrant's entry probability and its expected prot. However there is no feasible optimal level of conservative bias in this case. The results from the numeric example suggest that such accounting distortion also lower the expected prot even in the presence of entry competition, but increasing the informative quality of cost information could improve the expected prot level. And when accounting system is not fully informative or not entirely uninformative 21 , then the incumbent rms might enjoy a higher expected prot by precommiting to an aggressive accounting policy.
There are several caveats and some further improvements could be considered for this study. First of all, as suggested by Cal-Or (1986) and Vives (2006) , the type of information disclosed in the competition could have eects on the optimal level of disclosure. As the focus of this paper is not to derive the optimal disclosure level, this is less concern to the current setting. However it would be interesting to see how the present results will change if one assumes Bertrand game. Secondly, social welfare analysis could also provide more policy implications. Thirdly, only one period of reporting is considered. So rms' competitive position might be dierent in a multiple period setting. The hidden reserve eect of conservative reporting could change the way how rms update the accounting signal and compete. Moreover, as the current setting only considers the production market, the interaction of conservatism and other inuencing factor i.e. debt contracting is not included yet. A further extension could be a setting where rms with debt nancing compete in a product market. 21 The two boundary choice of λ Appendix:
The duopoly production strategy As described, the maximization problem for rmi is
So according to the conjectured linear output strategies,
Then combine these two strategies and take the expectation based on the information set we have:
Then substitute the conjectured strategies into the rst order condition to obtain the following functions:
So by comparing the coecients of these two equation groups, the groups of functions can be obtained as: The probability table It is assumed that the entrant enters the market when it observes its own unit cost is smaller than the boundary costc e . So E (c e | s 1 , s 2 ) = E (c e | c e ≤c e ) = 
2.Entry probability
Next the probability of entry P e also can be calculated based on the assumption of the entrant's cost distribution and the boundary costc e : P e = P (c e ≤c e ) =c e−(e−ω) 2ω then substitutingc e into P e , obtain P (c e ≤c e ) = 
3.Expected entrant's cost
As the expectations of the entrant's cost is considered as the mean of e − ω and the boundary costc e , given the disclosed signals and the derived expression ofc e , the value of E (c e | s 1 , s 2 ) should be:
E (c e ) = 
